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THE ART OF CHRISTIAN ATHEISM: FAITH AND
PHILOSOPHY IN EARLY HEIDEGGER
James K. A. Smith

In his early work, Martin Heidegger argues for a rigorous methodological
atheism in philosophy, which is not opposed to religious faith but only to
the impact of faith when one is philosophizing. For the young Heidegger,
the philosopher, even though possibly a religious person, must be an atheist
when doing philosophy. Christian philosophy, then, is a round square. In
this essay, I unpack Heidegger's methodological considerations and
attempt to draw parallels with other traditions which argue for the possibility of a Christian philosophy but at root concede Heidegger's atheism. In
conclusion, I propose that it is precisely Heidegger's work which points to
the inescapabiIity of and opens the door to religious philosophy.

Christian atheism is a little old now, rather passe, perhaps even modem
(which, ironically, now means confined to the past-no longer contemporary). As John A.T. Robinson, Thomas J.J. Altizer and William
Hamilton attempted to demonstrate, the God of theism-the God of
metaphysics-is a false god, an idol which has nothing to do with the
God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob or the God and Father of Jesus of
Nazareth.' This atheism does not concern the "existence" of God but
rather the priority of Being and metaphysics when it comes to speaking
of God. As Jean-Luc Marion has suggested, "God is, exists, and that is
the least of things. At issue here is not the possiblity of God's attaining
to Being, but, quite the opposite, the possibility of Being's attaining to
God."2 And in this regard, I too must confess that I am not a theist, that I
am a Christian a-theist; but in so doing, I consider myself to be a good
disciple, following the Galilean who knew nothing of theism, who was
himself a good a-theist. (Nevertheless, a number of Christians persist in
their theism, and a number of Christian philosophers continue to delude
themselves by thinking that theistic philosophy is Christian.)
However, the idea of a Christian atheism is older than perhaps we
have supposed. As I will attempt to show, a similar yet distinct notion is
uncovered in the early lectures of Martin Heidegger from 1919-23, drawing on even earlier precedents. But Heidegger's Christian atheism is different than the death of God theologians: his Christian atheist is a
philosopher, one who has a knack for being both a philosopher and a
Christian, which means being both an atheist and yet religious.
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Heidegger was not concerned about the idea of a theistic philosophy
(which he would have seen as simply an instantiation of the Western
metaphysical tradition), but rather about the very possibility of
Christian philosophy, the possibility of a philosopher having faith when
philosophizing. While the first form of Christian a-theism is marked by
the refusal to equate the God of Abraham and the God of metaphysics,
the Christian atheism of Heidegger is concerned with excluding faith
from philosophy, keeping philosophy pure from such contaminations.
Now, while I would confess that I am a Christian a-theist, I would at
the same time confess that I am a Christian philosopher. And so here I
am (me voici), between South Bend and Freiburg, an a-theist Christian
philosopher, soliciting the ire of both theists and atheists. In this paper, I
won't be taking on the theists (which is always a rather hazardous project, opposing these ones with theos on their side); rather I will focus on
Heidegger's critique. Rather than concluding with Heidegger that it is
impossible for the philosopher to believe, I will propose that it is impossible for the philosopher not to believe, and that such a conclusion is one
that is required by Heidegger's very own hermeneutic phenomenology.

Philosophy, Atheism and Faith
Though we will hear about Heidegger's insistence on atheism, the
young Freiburg lecturer was by no means opposed to religion or faith.
As Hugo Ott, Theodore Kisiel, and John van Buren have recently shown,
it was precisely his Christian faith (first Catholic and then Protestant)
which was the impetus for his early philosophical breakthroughs. 3 What
is at stake, then, is the relationship between faith and philosophy, and it
is here that Heidegger preaches atheism. For instance, in
Wintersemester 1921/22, Heidegger insisted:
Questioningness [Fraglichkeit] is not religious, but it may nevertheless lead me to a position where I must make a religious decision. I do not behave religiously in philosophizing, even if I as a
philosopher can be a religious man. "But here is the art": to philosophize and thereby to be genuinely religious, i.e., to take up
factically its worldly, historical task in philosophizing, in action
and a world of action, not in religious ideology and fantasy.
Philosophy, in its radical self-positing questioningness, must
be in principle a theistic. 4
Philosophy is radical questioning; but to really question-to push one's
questioning to the brink of the abyss-one must be an atheist, for faith
gives answers too soon. Even into the next decade, in 1935, Heidegger
maintained this principle of methodological atheism, arguing that
Anyone for whom the Bible is divine revelation and truth has
the answer to the question, "Why are there essents rather than
nothing?" even before it is asked: everything that is, except God
himself, has been created by Him .... One who holds to such a
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faith can in a way participate in the asking of our question, but
he cannot really question without ceasing to be a believer and
taking all of the consequences of such a step. He will only be
able to act 'as if ... s
Faith and philosophy, according to Heidegger (who was only following in the footsteps of Paul and Martin Luther 6), are "mortal enemies."
In fact, "[fJaith is so absolutely the mortal enemy that philosophy does
not even begin to want in any way to do battle with it."7 "The philosopher does not believe,"B cannot believe, because faith is in radical opposition to the very nature of philosophy as questioning. If philosophy is
going to "make factical life speak for itself" it must be "fundamentally
atheistic."9 That is why the idea of a 'Christian philosophy' is a "square
circle" and a "round square."HI
It may be a legitimate question to ask how much this opposing of
faith and philosophy owes to Heidegger's unfortunate experiences as a
"Catholic philosopher,"!! for it was after these experiences that perhaps
the earliest glimpse of this disjunction is uncovered. In a 1919 letter to
his long-time mentor, Engelbert Krebs, the young Heidegger explains
that he must give up his faith to fulfil his calling to be a philosopher.
"The past two years," he begins,
in which I have sought to clarify my basic theological position,
putting aside every special academic assignment in order to do
so, have led me to conclusions for which, had I been constrained
by extraphilosophical allegiances, I could not have guaranteed
the necessary independence of conviction and doctrine. 12
Philosophy cannot be contained by extra-philosophical allegiances, such
as faith, and that is why good philosophers need to be atheists, at least
when they are doing philosophy.
When Heidegger asserts that philosophy must be 'methodologically
atheistic,' he is not simply saying that philosophy shouldn't be theistic,
that it should not be tied to metaphysics (as I would agree); rather, his
emphasis is that philosophy is not religious and cannot be such. The
philosopher does not believe-period. It is not a debate about the object
or content of faith, but rather the absence of faith in philosophy.

Heidegger's Thomism?
It seems to me that I have heard something like this before, not from
an apostate but from a good Catholic. For is not this notion of a pure,
faith-free philosophy a very Thomistic idea? Do we not hear similar
rumblings from Paris in the thirteenth century? Did not the Angelic
Doctor himself insist that philosophy is the domain of natural, unaided,
human reason and that faith is left to theology?13 Isn't Heidegger's
philosophical atheism actually an indicator of his Thomism? While neither Thomas nor Thomists ever insisted on methodological atheism in
philosophy, the understanding of the nature of philosophy in the
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Thomist tradition betrays an interesting parallel with Heidegger. And
this is true of both the "manual tradition" of Thomism and the neoThomism of Gilson and company, even though the Gilsonian tradition
will insist on using the term "Christian philosophy." Let me explain the
analogy between these opposing schools before comparing both to early
Heidegger.
A recent essay by Jude Dougherty is representative of a long tradition
of Catholic philosophers. For Dougherty, the idea of a "Christian philosophy" is an oxymoron-like a square circle-because philosophy which
is influenced by revelation is no longer (good) philosophy; that is, "philosophy must remain unalloyed if it is to be true philosophy. It must
justify to its hearer every conclusion it reaches by the evidence it produces and the inferences it makes."14 Or as Joseph Owens expounds this
tradition (commenting from a Gilsonian perspective):
Philosophy grounded its reasoning on naturally acceptable starting points. It could not make use of revealed truth as premises
for demonstrations. In consequence it could not permit itself to
be specified by anything that was given through divine revelation. In this traditional setting no philosophy seemed amenable
to designation by the notion "Christian," as many modern writers viewed the situation. Hence arose the stand that there can no
more be a Christian philosophy than there could be a Christian
mathematics or a Christian chemistry.15
While these philosophers are not atheists, neither are they Christians,
when they philosophize. For both Dougherty and Heidegger, faith is
excluded from philosophy. This does not, however, exclude God from
philosophy, for Dougherty; rather,it is precisely the God of metaphysics-the god of theism-who appears in "true" philosophy.
But interestingly, even Gilson's conception of the relationship
between faith and philosophy retains in essence the heart of Heidegger's
critique. For while Gilson would insist on using the term "Christian philosophy," faith remains extrinsic to philosophy. Faith only makes suggestions for research projects16; once that theme is taken up, the philosopher is engaged in an activity that is shielded from the influence of faith.
Christian faith provides clues to "naturally knowable starting points"
that are pursued by the philosopher (the most famous, of course, being
Exodus 3:14), but once philosophy proper begins, Christian faith steps
aside. "The result," Owens concludes, "is that on such a basis an entire
philosophy may be specified as Christian, even though nothing specifically Christian enters into its reasoning process .... [T]he path itself
remains extrinsic to the strictly philosophical discourse."17 In essence,
this conception is in agreement with Heidegger insofar as philosophy
proper remains untainted by faith.
I have detoured into the Thomist tradition in order to point out striking analogies with Heidegger and to suggest a source for Heidegger's
insistence on methodological atheism. Heidegger's strong Catholic
roots are well known by now, as well as his affinity with and interest in
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Scholastic philosophy. In addition, his work on the Habilitationschrift
was funded by a grant from the 'Constantin and Olga von Schaezler
Foundation in honour of St. Thomas Aquinas,' which was secured by
Heidegger's application in which he confessed: "The obedient undersigned intends to devote himself to the study of Christian philosophy
and to embark on an academic career."IS Ten years later, Heidegger
would reject the notion of Christian philosophy as a "square circle" and
rather insist on atheism. But was this such a momentous shift as some
have assumed? As we have seen, the understanding of philosophy in
the Thomist tradition is analogous, if not identical, to Heidegger's definition: both assert that faith remains extrinsic to philosophy qua philosophy. And this remains true despite the very different results of such
similar methodologies. In the Thomist tradition, pure philosophy can
still deliver God, the God of metaphysics, known by natural reason; as
such, Thomism is a theism. For Heidegger, however, 'God' could never
appear in philosophy, would never 'show' her/his face as a phenomenon; thus philosophy excludes not only faith but also God.
This conception of the relationship between faith and philosophy is
not confined to neo-Scholastic Catholics; it can also be locateed in contemporary discussions, as seen, for instance, in the work of Jean-Luc
Marion. A rigorous critic of metaphysics and its god, Marion has recently insisted on God outside/without Being (sans l'etre). However, God
still appears in his phenomenology as a phenomenon which saturates
our intention and aim l9-God still shows his face in philosophy as phenomenology. Nevertheless, the God of phenomenology must still be
distinguished from the "God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob" inasmuch as God appears only as a "possibility" in phenomenology.
Phenomenology can identify the saturated phenomenon, but it is the
role of faith to name such as God. "Reason-here philosophy in its phenomenological bearing" -must eventually yield to faith, to revealed theology. And one must be vigilant, Marion asserts, not to confuse phenomenology (reason) and revealed theology (faith).2n
Finally, the same boundary may be found in a deconstructionist
Catholic philosopher such as John Caputo. Though Caputo has no
investments in Thomism (though the tradition is certainly part of his
development), a similar framework seems to emerge in his work.
Reflecting on the possibility of Christian philosophy today, Caputo is
"struck by the openings that postmodern thinking creates for Christian
philosophy today."21 But again, the relationship between Christian faith
and philosophy is extrinsic to the act of philosophizing. As Caputo
defines the term, Christian philosophy means "thinking philosophically
within the context and the framework of the New Testament ... .! suggest
we hear the expression 'Christian philosophy' the way we hear expressions like 'Greek philosophy' or 'French philosophy,' as indicative of a
certain style, a certain idiom ... "22 I think Gilson would agree: philosophy
is philosophy, and faith has nothing to do with it, even though it may
provide a style or idiom.
For Caputo, then, philosophy proper is shielded from faith; thus a
philosopher can only say so much. Eventually philosophy meets its
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match, its limit or horizon, and only faith can step beyond. For instance,
in his commentary on Levinas, Caputo concludes that philosophically we
cannot say who calls: Il or il y a. The one calling remains anonymous,
and this anonymity is the horizon of faith. 23 Philosophically, we cannot
say whether Nietzsche or Kierkegaard is right-such a decision lies
beyond philosophy, and the realm of faith.24 When I philosophize, I am
an atheist, because philosophy is inevitably and necessarily 'Greek,' and
by definition excludes the religious, the 'Hebrew.'
Evidently, then, Heidegger's notion of methodological atheism is a
rather popular one, though it is never explicitly described as such by
others.2s As I have attempted to demonstrate, the relationship of faith
and philosophy receives similar treatment in philosophers ranging from
Gilson to Caputo. It may be safe to say, in fact, that very few disagree
with Heidegger's critique, including those that espouse a "Christian phi10sophy."26 For Heidegger would also concede that Christian philosophy may be a sociological category;27 but when he discusses the impossibility of Christian philosophy, he refers to the unalloyed nature of philosophy which even good Thomists would agree on (though, it must be
emphasized, their results are markedly different).

Demythologizing Heidegger
But is philosophy so pure? Is not the notion of an autonomous philosophy precisely the demon that Heidegger's own work was engaged
in battling? Was it not Heidegger who insisted on the role of presuppositions and preunderstanding in philosophy? Is not this excising of faith
from Dasein akin to the reduction to a transcendental-logical ego, the
animal that Heidegger declared to be mythical? Can I stop believing
when I philosophize? Do I?
It is here that I would like to propose that Heidegger, when discussing faith and philosophy, draws back from where the trajectory of
his own thought would lead. The whole of Heidegger's early work is
bent on demonstrating that we are not disembodied egos, but rather
human be-ings (Dasein) who are in the world, and who cannot extrapolate ourselves outside of that environment (Umwelt). We are in-der- Weltseirz, as embodied, historical, situated beings. We are here (Da), now,
and such is a condition for my knowing anything. We cannot step outside of our skin or transcend our finitude. Hans-Georg Gadamer carried
on this work in his philosophical hermeneutics, insisting that we cannot
know apart from bias, despite all of the Enlightenment protests to the
contrary. In fact, this Enlightenment critique of prejudice is itself a prejudice and must be owned up as such. Weare effected by our history
and tradition. 28
Philosophy, then, is not a pure, unalloyed, transcendental science,
though it is a theoretical discipline (Wissenschaft). But as Heidegger's
own work demonstrates, theory is not free from prejudice, from "extraphilosophical" influences-a point which has been demonstrated in a
number of arenas since Heidegger: Thomas Kuhn, for instance, pointed
to the paradigms or frameworks of belief which direct the sciences. Of
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special interest here is the fact that throughout his landmark study,
Kuhn uses the language of faith to describe the relationship between
paradigms and science: words such as "conversion," "belief," and "commitment,"29 signalling that there is a commitment which precedes theoretical work and which makes that theoretical work possible. 30
The work of Gadamer, Ricouer, Kuhn, and Polanyi-all of which
points to the influence of 'extra-philosophical' commitments-is all
dependent, directly or indirectly, on the insights of the early Heidegger
as crystallized in Being and Time. And yet, it is precisely this young
Heidegger who insists on excluding the influence of faith from philosophy. Do we not find at this juncture a vestige of Enlightenment rationalism in the work of this one who played such a pivotal role in its dismantlement?3! Would not a more insistent hermeneutic phenomenology
honor the role played by faith in philosophizing? Research in this century
has demonstrated that philosophy (and all theory) is conditioned by previous commitments which not only provide starting points (as in the
Gilsonian tradition), but make philosophy possible. Whether these previous commitments are described as worldviews (Jaspers), paradigms
(Kuhn), final vocabularies (Rorty), prejudices (Gadamer), or forehavings
(Heidegger), they all refer to beliefs which are constitutive of human
knowing, and as such, philosophy.
Perhaps what theorists in this century have not yet appreciated is the
religious nature of these commitments. Because of certain twists and
turns in the history of Western philosophy (and Christianity) "faith" has
been confined to largely 'institutional' commitments and reduced to
something like 'propositional assent to' some doctrine. As such, faith
became defined by its content or object. I am proposing a retrieval of a
broader meaning of pistis (and pisteuo) as trust or commitment. The
result of this broadening is two-fold: first, faith is no longer determined
by the object or content of the commitment but rather as the commitment
itself. Any fundamental, grounding commitment (which is not itself
grounded) may be legitimately described as a faith, which is simply to
say that pistis may be translated many ways. A second implication of
this retrieval is the correlative broadening of the notion of "religion" as
simply a commitment to and trust in something 'ultimate' which cannot
be rationally proven, but rather stands at the beginning of all reason and
theory?2 That which is believed is not argued to but argued from. "If I
have exhausted the justifications," Wittgenstein commented," I have
reached bedrock and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say,
'this is simply what I do."'33 For my purposes here, it is not primarily a
question of what someone is trusting but that someone is committed
before theory, before reason.
When Heidegger argues for methodological atheism when doing philosophy, he is really asserting that faith plays no role in philosophizing.
But given that intention, must we not ask: Is atheism religiously neutral?
Is the atheist without faith? Does not the atheist also have extra-philosophical commitments, beliefs which give the answer too soon, undoing
the nature of philosophy as radical questioning? Does not this religiously neutral philosopher hang out with Descartes' bodiless cogito and rub
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shoulders with Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological ego, in a
mythical world of purity?
Could it be that faith is inescapable? It is this scandalous thesis which
I think has not yet been fully grasped, though the path has been cleared
in recent years by emergence of postmodernism. It is postmodernism,
and (perhaps surprisingly) deconstruction in particular, which signals
the religious character of philosophy, for as Alan Olson has proposed,
"it may be that the deconstructive mood of postmodernity is faithinspired-even faith-obsessed in an obscure sort of way."34 Faith- commitment, trust-is that which makes theory (and philosophy) possible.
Not that every philosopher will attend church or synagogue; but every
philosopher will and must operate with an ultimate trust which makes
philosophy possible. Philosophy is inescapably religious, but that is not
to say that Athens is covertly Jerusalem, or that the 'Hebrew' necessarily
infiltrates the 'Greek.' Greece, one must recall, had its own religion.
This is seen, for instance, in Derrida's insistent questioning of the
question in Of Spirit, a work haunted by ghosts, in which we catch
glimpse of a spectre (let us say, l'esprit) lurking beneath and behind
Derrida's corpus, his body (0£ writings). This spirit is conjured up not at
Endor but in a telling note: a note, offered as a pledge, on the origins of
language as a promise. In a passage hovering between commentary and
autobiography, he remarks:
It remains to find out whether this Versprechen is not the
promise which, opening every speaking, makes possible the
very question and therefore precedes it without belonging to it:
the dissymmetry of an affirmation, of a yes before all opposition
of yes and no .... Language always, before any question, and in the
very question, comes down to the promise. This would also be
a promise of spirit. 35

The note follows on the heels of this passage as an attempt to understand this unexpected visitation of (the) spirit. Here we are directed to
an "originaryallegiance" or "commitment" which precedes every questioning, before any distinction between yes and no; that is, one begins by
trusting a promise, a commitment before the word, a "wordless word
which we name the 'yes'."'" That is why "[plarole must first pray,
address itself to us: put in us its trust, its confidence, depend on us, and
even have already done it."37 And this pledge, he continues, this
'already,' is essential because it reaches back to a moment of alreadyhaving-trusted, an older event, part of a past which never returns, and
never 'was.' This analysis strikes at the very heart of the Heideggerian
notion of methodological atheism by positing a commitment before the
question, for it was precisely the radical "questioningness" [Fraglichkeit]
of philosophy which he felt called for atheism in philosophy.

Conclusion: Rounding the Square
I have attempted to expound Heidegger's notion of "methodological
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atheism" as well as its parallels and analogies in Thomistic systems, suggesting that the parallels are not merely coincidental but perhaps indicate a common source.
Oeconstructively, I have argued that Heidegger's insistence on faithfree philosophy is impossible, given his own dismantling of the
Enlightenment tradition and development of hermeneutical thought, as
well as later contributions by Gadamer, Kuhn and Polanyi. Rather than
agreeing that "the philosopher does not believe," I would assert that the
philosopher can't help but believe. Oerrida suggests the same in his
Memoirs of the Blind. "Do you believe?" an interlocutor asks. "I don't
know," someone responds, "one has to be/ieve ... "38 It is inescapable: one
must (il faut) be committed, give credence, have faith (croire).
Constructively, this means that the circle is not so square after all.
Rather than being mortal enemies (Heidegger), nor extrinsic to one
another (Gilson, Caputo), faith and philosophy are inextricably linked,
opening the door for the development of a Christian philosophy (and
not only the possibility of a Christian philosophy, but the religious
nature of philosophy itself). And it is precisely in the context of postmodern and deconstructionist discourse that an avenue is opened for
such work, because it is in this context that the role of commitment in all
theory is recognized.
Of course, I will continue to insist that Christian philosophy remain
atheistic; not in the sense of being without faith, but in the sense of
rejecting the idol of theism. And that is still a bit of an art.
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